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The Pacific Alliance Casts Its Cloud 
over Latin America
Detlef Nolte and Leslie Wehner
In a joint declaration on 8 October 2013, the presidents of the Pacific Alliance (PA) – an 
organisation legally constituted in 2012 that is comprised of Chile, Colombia, Peru and 
Mexico – announced the conclusion of trade negotiations to remove all tariff barriers be­
tween its member states, thus making it the eighth largest economy in the world. This 
new free trade agreement (FTA) has attracted the interest of states and business sectors 
around the world, including the German Business Association for Latin America, which 
will dedicate its Latin American Day conference in November 2013 to this new group. 
Analysis
The PA will remove 92 percent of all trade tariffs by the end of 2013 and progressively 
lift the remaining 8 percent. Whereas financial markets and some of its protagonists de­
pict the PA as the new star in Latin America, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
Our Americas (ALBA) and most of the countries of the Southern Common Market (Mer­
cado Común del Sur – Mercosur) see the PA as a new attempt by the United States to 
undermine alternative patterns of regional integration in the Americas.
  The PA is an economic alliance that revives the open regionalist model of the early 
1990s in Latin America in that it seeks to increase intratrade and extraregional trade 
relationships with Asia, the United States and Europe; the PA states already have 
FTAs with the United States and the European Union.
  The positive view of the PA in Latin America and abroad is based on its econom­
ic potential. In fact, Australia, Canada, China, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Paraguay, 
South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United States and Uruguay have already applied 
for and been granted observer status. Moreover, Costa Rica and Panama are on their 
way to becoming full members.
  At the political level, however, the PA has created friction in the region as it brings 
Mexico into South America – an area seen by Brazil as its sphere of influence. More­
over, the PA countries have good relations with the United States and are in line 
with its FTA agenda. 
Keywords: Pacific Alliance, Latin America, United States, regional integration
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From the Pacific Arch to the Pacific Alliance
The idea to create the PA – initially branded as the 
Pacific Arch – was first promoted by the then presi­
dent of Peru, Alan Garcia, in 2006. At that time, 
Peru found itself isolated as Venezuela had left 
the Andean Community (CAN) and both Bolivia 
and Ecuador (two CAN members) were showing 
more of a vocation for ALBA than for the former 
group. Moreover, Peru oriented its economic ef­
forts to the Asia-Pacific region as a key market, as 
did Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Five years later, 
 in April 2011, these four states came together and 
formally agreed to launch the PA. The constitu­
tive treaty was signed in Antofagasta, Chile, on 6 
June 2012. 
As outlined in the various PA declarations, the 
primary goal of this new regional group is to build 
a zone of deep economic integration and progress 
toward the free circulation of goods, services, cap­
ital and people. The group aspires to achieve sus­
tainable economic growth and competitiveness by 
increasing intra- and extraregional trade. The PA 
was also created with the objective of becoming a 
platform of political coordination and projection 
to the rest of the world, especially the Asia-Pacific 
region (see <http://alianzapacifico.net>). 
During the PA’s fifth presidential meeting in 
November 2012, a consensus was reached to es­
tablish an FTA that lifts tariff barriers on most 
goods and introduces a phase­out period for sen­
sitive products over the course of 2013. At the EU–
Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC) summit in January 2013 in San­
tiago de Chile, the presidents further reinforced 
their ambition with the prompt conclusion of ne­
gotiations on all remaining issues – such as rules 
of origin, public procurement, services and capi­
tal (including Mexico’s financial integration of its 
stock markets with those of Chile, Colombia and 
Peru under the Latin American Integrated Mar­
ket), customs cooperation, sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures, and technical barriers to trade. 
During the PA summit in May 2013 in Cali, Co­
lombia, the four presidents once again stressed 
the need to have a full-fledged FTA in place in the 
shortest possible time. The successful completion 
of the negotiations was announced on 8 October 
2013 in El País. 
Back to Open Regionalism in Latin America 
Latin America has experienced a proliferation of 
regional organizations in the last two decades. 
Newcomers such as Mercosur (1991), the Associa­
tion of Caribbean States (ACS, 1994), ALBA (2004), 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, 
2008), CELAC (2010) and the PA joined old re­
gional groups that had reshaped and repacked 
their goals and rebranded themselves to adopt 
the premises and purposes of the new regional­
ism that predominated in the 1990s – such as the 
Andean Pact (now Andean Community) and the 
Common Central American Market (SICA). Thus, 
Latin America offers a broad spectrum of region­
al organizations that prioritize different issue 
areas and reflect different types of integration 
and/or cooperation. Furthermore, they represent 
divergent models of regional cooperation span­
ning from the promotion of free trade to socialist­
driven projects. 
One can characterize this constellation of dif­
ferent regional groups with different trajectories 
as “modular regionalism” (Gardini 2013) or as 
“variable geometry.” This variable geometry im­
plies that member states have the option to coop­
erate with different partners in the realization of 
common objectives while still enjoying exit op­
tions. These opt­out possibilities are to be used 
when one group (or one measure within a group) 
becomes too costly for a member state. Although 
these exit options trigger forum shopping among 
members of regional groups, they also minimize 
the risk of zero-sum politics and thus consolidate 
a regime of cooperative regional governance. In 
addition, exit options reduce the chances for veto-
players to block the advancement of regional pro-
jects. 
From this perspective, each Latin American 
country can choose the mix of regional organi­
zations or cooperation structures that best fits its 
interests. Like­minded states join forces to foster 
their common interests. Taking the issue of free 
trade and open markets as an example, it is pos­
sible to differentiate between the interests of the 
countries of the PA, Mercosur and ALBA. The 
countries that form part of these groupings have 
different average most-favored-nation (MFN) tar­
iffs and different numbers of FTA partners (see 
Figures 1 and 2). The Chilean president, Sebas­
tián Piñera, has indicated that states and their 
views “have to learn to live together in diversity” 
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(El Tiempo 2012), thereby acknowledging the ex­
istence of different views and interests regarding 
the purpose of regional integration. 
Figure 1: Average Applied MFN Tariff (in %)
Source:  IDB 2012.
Figure 2: Number of Free Trade Agreements 
Partners
Source:  IDB 2012.
In the 1990s, Latin American regionalism was as­
sociated with the premise of open regionalism, 
which aimed to promote markets of scale and ef­
ficiency through regional trade liberalization. The 
ultimate objective of this open regionalist model 
was successful integration into the global econ­
omy. However, since the turn of the century, Lat­
in American regionalism has become less focused 
on economic liberalization and more political in 
its orientation. This change was the result of vot­
er disappointment with economic globalization at 
the national level and a shift to left-oriented gov­
ernments. The new regionalism projects sought 
political consensus building, the promotion of re­
gional independencies and an increase in cooper­
ation in nontrade issues (e.g., energy, infrastruc­
ture, finance and regional security). It should be 
noted, however, that older regional organizations 
and projects did not disappear. Instead, they co­
existed in an overlap of older and newer organi­
zations, resulting in the current mosaic of Latin 
American regionalism. 
In fact, it is possible to identify three types of 
regional projects in Latin America: (1) projects 
with a strong emphasis on trade-driven integra­
tion (NAFTA, PA); (2) hybrid projects combin­
ing trade (sometimes with new elements), doses 
of state intervention and political posttrade objec­
tives (UNASUR, SICA, Mercosur, CAN); and (3) 
a project that emphasizes political and social as­
pects of integration and is driven by socialist ideas 
and thus strong state intervention in the economy 
(ALBA) (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012: 11). 
The PA has revived the debate on these dif­
ferent types of regional cooperation and group­
ings because it has returned the open regionalism 
model to Latin America. Indeed, the four PA mem­
bers are fully committed to the rules of the game of 
economic globalization and are also countries that 
enjoy FTAs with each other. The PA is thus an ef­
fort to harmonize and expand these existing FTAs 
and develop a free trade area. Moreover, new full 
memberships will only be accepted by the PA on 
the condition that candidates already have an FTA 
in place with each member of the group. 
The New Darling of the Economist(s)
For Felipe Larraín, Chile’s finance minister, the PA 
is “the most exciting thing going on today in Latin 
America” (The Economist, 29 April 2013). A recent 
Deutsche Bank Research publication (2013) cham­
pioned the PA countries as “Latin America’s new 
stars,” while the Economist called on other Latin 
American countries to “join the club” (29 April 
2013). In a self-promoting event, the four presi-
dents of the PA declared that their trade agree­
ment constitutes “a robust institutional and judi­
cial framework that creates certainty for invest­
ments and free trade” (El País, 8 October 2013). 
Business associations and financial markets 
are supportive of the new organization. Since it 
accounts for 35.6 percent of the Latin American 
population, the accumulated GDP would make it 
the eighth most important economy in the world 
– though this was still smaller than Brazil’s GDP 
in 2012. The PA received 41 percent of the invest­
ments in the region and accounted for 50 percent 
of Latin American and Caribbean exports and im­
ports in 2012 – a much higher share than the Mer­
cosur (Table 1). Moreover, recent average GDP 
growth rates for some PA countries have been 
higher than those for Mercosur and ALBA coun­
tries (ECLAC 2013a). 
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Table 1: Share in Latin American and Caribbean 
Trade of PA and Mercosur (in %)
Exports Imports
2012 2012
PA/LAC 50 50
EPA/LAC 52 54
Mercosur/LAC 39 35
Note:  EPA – Enlarged PA (including Costa Rica and 
Panama).
Source:  SELA 2013: 23.
Two Economic Models
While some economists are excited by the cre­
ation of the PA, the Latin American Left sees it as 
a US tool to subvert regional integration and pro­
mote its normative views on trade issues in South 
America. In the final declaration (6 August 2013) of 
its 19th meeting, the Foro de São Paulo – a group­
ing of leftist parties and organizations – reproved 
“the attempts inspired by extraregional powers 
with the objective to fracture and sabotage region­
al integration as in the case of the so called Pacif­
ic Alliance – which not by accident is composed 
of countries which have free trade agreements 
with the United States – and the tireless efforts 
to generate crisis and inspire divisions within the 
Mercosur” (<http://forodesaopaulo.org/?p=3030>, 
authors’ own translation).
The framing of the PA as an instrument of US 
hegemony is also shared by various intellectuals 
and officials from the center-left in Latin Ameri­
ca. For example, the Argentinian intellectual Atilio 
Borón (2013a; 2013b) depicts the PA as “the most 
important piece of the imperialist counterattack, 
which is seeking to implement the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) under another 
name” and it is “basically a political­military alli­
ance, even though it tries to present itself as mere­
ly an economic alliance. Its main objective is to 
erode the bloc of South American countries and 
especially UNASUR” (authors’ own translations). 
Similarly, in his commentary during the ALBA’s 
last meeting in Ecuador, the Bolivian minister of 
the presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, revealed 
the group’s fears that “the strategy of the Pacific 
Alliance is not just commercial, it is a political and 
military strategy [seeking] to reinstall the Wash­
ington Consensus and the FTAA [Free Trade Area 
of the Americas]” (LAWR-13-31, 8 August 2013). 
Such statements by official state representa­
tives and intellectuals reflect a left-right cleavage 
and diverging opinions about cooperation pro-
jects at the regional level, which are based on dif­
ferent norms and values. These differences are al­
so corroborated by statements by official repre­
sentatives of the competing integration projects. 
In an interview with Colombian newspaper El 
Tiempo (2012), Chilean president Sebastián Piñera 
declared that there are two different visions and 
models in the region and that the countries of the 
PA share a common vision of economic develop­
ment that consists of “a social market economy, 
of entrepreneurship, innovation, private initiative 
and integration into the world” (authors’ trans­
lation). This view is substantiated by the Index of 
Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation and 
the Wall Street Journal, which ranks the PA coun­
tries much higher than the ALBA and Mercosur 
countries – excluding the two Mercosur countries 
with observer status in the PA (see Table 2). 
During his country’s hosting of an ALBA meet­
ing in Guayaquil on 31 July 2013, Ecuador pres­
ident Rafael Correa differentiated between “two 
opposing visions of the world: neoliberalism and 
free trade versus those that believe in socialism 
and the guarantee of rights; those that believe not 
in free trade zones but zones free of hunger and 
free of poverty” (LAWR-13-31, 8 August 2013).  
Table 2: Index of Economic Freedom 2013
Rank Pacific Alliance Mercosur ALBA
7 Chile
36 Uruguay
37 Colombia
44 Peru
50 Mexico
67 Costa Rica
71 Panama
80 Paraguay
100 Brazil
110 Nicaragua
156 Bolivia
159 Ecuador
160 Argentina
174 Venezuela Venezuela
176 Cuba
Source:  <www.heritage.org/index/ranking>.
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It might therefore be interesting to take a look 
at the social balance sheet of the member coun­
tries of both ALBA and the PA. This is not to claim 
that regional groups reduce or enhance poverty 
and income distribution levels, but to see wheth­
er real ity matches the leaders’ rhetoric when they 
defend their economic models and cite the pros of 
their regional groups (see Table 3). 
When looking at the variation of the pov erty 
lines of each country for the period 2002–2011, 
the balance is not conclusive. The member coun­
tries of both organizations have reduced pov erty 
– though this decrease was less pronounced in 
Mexico. Nevertheless, the poverty level is gener­
ally lower in the PA countries (with the exception 
of Mexico) than in the ALBA countries. However, 
according to the Gini index – which measures in­
come distribution (1 means total inequality and 0 
means total equality) – the reduction of inequality 
was more pronounced in the ALBA countries. So 
the effects of the different economic models pro­
moted by the PA and ALBA on poverty reduction 
and income distribution are mixed at best.
Economic and Political-Strategic Implications
While the PA countries share economic interests 
that are not contingent upon the incumbent gov­
ernment, the same is not true in regard to political 
strategic issues. Peru and Chile still have pending 
disputes regarding their maritime borders. More­
over, Chile might soon swing back to a center-left 
government, which will see less political accord 
with the other PA governments. Additionally, the 
member countries are confronted with different 
domestic security challenges (e.g., armed conflict 
in Colombia and drug-related crimes in Mexico). 
Last but not least, these countries’ security agen­
das are determined by the (sub)regional context. 
Mexico, for instance, is closely linked to the Unit­
ed States, while the South American governments 
have created their own security architecture with 
UNASUR and the South American Defense Coun­
cil at its core. 
Hence, the PA is primarily an FTA that has 
both political and economic consequences. In the 
economic realm, the PA is about promoting mem­
ber states’ markets and products in the Asia-Pacif-
ic region and thus also acts as a coordination 
forum for common positions and policies in that 
regard. Putting aside the tensions between the 
inter ests of each of the PA members to potentiate 
its export capacity and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) attractiveness, they all share the key ambi­
tion to position the PA within the Chinese mar­
ket as part of the group’s Asia-Pacific aspirations. 
Moreover, three members of the PA are part of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative – an 
on-going FTA negotiation process between Aus­
tralia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States 
and Vietnam. The only country not included in 
the TPP is Colombia, which has shown an inter­
est in joining this group as well as the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) if new admissions 
are to be considered by both initiatives. Given the 
number of APEC countries involved in the TPP 
negotiations, the United States sees the TPP as an 
alternative way to achieve the unrealized APEC 
goals set in 1994 at the meeting in Bogor, Indone­
sia, regarding free and open trade and investment 
for industrialized countries in 2010 and for devel­
oping economies in 2020. 
In the political realm, Colombian president 
Juan Manuel Santos stated during the presidential 
meeting in Antofagasta, Chile (6 June 2012), that 
“the Pacific Alliance was not positioned against 
anyone or any state in particular.” However, the 
PA has generated a new dynamic of soft balanc­
ing in Latin America. While the PA excludes Bra­
zil (though this regional power has no interest in 
joining the endeavor), it has brought Mexico in­
to South America. Mexico had lost its influence in 
the region in the early 1990s when it shifted its for­
eign policy priorities to NAFTA. Although Mexico 
has emphasized the commercial dimension of the 
PA, it is at the same time perceived by countries 
such as Chile and Colombia as an opportunity to 
soft balance Brazil’s influence in South America. 
As secondary powers, Chile and Colombia are 
not against Brazil’s rise per se – though they do 
want to create options for themselves to reduce 
the asymmetric political dependence on Brazil 
as the regional power. Meanwhile, the Brazilian 
leadership has been trying to downplay the im­
portance of the PA (Malamud 2013). For instance, 
Marco Aurélio Garcia, foreign policy advisor to 
the president, stated that the PA was no chal­
lenge to the South American integration project of 
UNASUR (La Segunda online 2012). Similarly, the 
foreign minister, Antonio Patriota, declared in a 
June 2013 Senate hearing that the PA was main­
ly a marketing strategy that sought to repackage 
what was already in place (e.g., existing FTAs be­
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tween PA members) rather than some new inno­
vation. In spite of the Brazilian government’s at­
tempts to diminish the role of the PA, neighbor­
ing Paraguay and Uruguay still applied for obser-
ver status; this might be a first step in allowing in­
dividual Mercosur member states to negotiate bi­
lateral FTAs with third parties as the integration 
project shows signs of exhaustion and fragmenta­
tion (Latin America Brazil & Southern Cone Report, 
16 September 2013). 
In short, the PA not only affects Brazil’s region­
al power projection, it also has an impact on the 
regional integration and cooperation dynamics of 
both ALBA and Mercosur. Furthermore, it offers 
the US government new options to promote its 
free trade agenda in Latin America at a time when 
Washington is showing renewed interest in Latin 
America. During President Obama’s first term, the 
region was a low priority and the general balance 
of US policy on Latin America was disappointing 
(Whitehead and Nolte 2012). However, this ap­
peared to change during Obama’s second term 
with his visit to Mexico and Costa Rica and Vice 
President Biden’s trip to Colombia, Brazil and 
Trinidad and Tobago in May 2013, where both ac­
tors emphasized the need to revitalize the United 
States’ ties with Latin America though such steps 
have not yet resulted in any tangible change. 
The PA and Europe 
The PA is also of interest to the European Union 
and European investors. During the 7th EU– 
Latin America and Caribbean Summit in Santiago 
de Chile (26–27 January 2013), the governments of 
the PA took the opportunity to promote their new 
alliance and to court European investors with the 
promise of open markets and legal certainty. 
The PA’s advances were well received by the 
president of the European Council, Herman van 
Rompuy, who described the PA “as a very promis­
ing initiative that brings together countries which 
share the EU’s views on open markets and mod­
ern economic policies, and which aims at creating 
an economic space similar to our own, based on 
the four freedoms of circulation of goods, capital, 
services, and persons.” He went on to say that “it 
is no coincidence that free trade agreements link 
the EU to all of the Alliance’s founding members 
[…] it will allow us to team up at the multilateral 
level to promote our common vision on trade and 
economic cooperation.”
The PA therefore provides the European 
Union with both a new and alternative partner in 
Latin America that shares its economic position 
and more options in the occasionally compli­
cated relationship with ALBA and Mercosur – es­
Poverty (% of population) Gini Index
2002 2011 2002 2011
Mercosur
Argentina 34.9 c 5.7 0.578 0.492
Brazil 37.5 b 20.9 0.639 b 0.559
Paraguay 61.0 b 49.6 0.558 b 0.546
Uruguay 15.4 6.7 0.455 0.402
Venezuela 48.6 29.5 0.500 0.397
ALBA
Bolivia 62.4 42.4 e 0.614 0.508 d
Ecuador 49.0 32.4 0.513 0.434
Nicaragua 69.4 b 58.3 d 0.579 b 0.478 g
Venezuela 48.6 29.5 0.500 0.397
Pacific Alliance
Chile 20.2 a 11.0 0.552 f 0.516
Colombia 49.7 34.2 0.567 0.545
Peru 54.7 b 27.8 0.525 b 0.452
Mexico 39.4 36.3 e 0.514 0.481 e
LAC 43.9 29.4
Table 3: Poverty (National Poverty Lines) and Income Inequality, 2002–2011
Note:  (a) 2000; (b) 2001; (c) 2004; (d) 2009; (e) 2010; (f) 2003; (g) 2005.
Source:  ECLAC 2013b: 18, 80, 102–103.
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pecially when relaunched FTA negotiations with 
the latter have not brought results. The PA might 
put pressure on countries without FTAs with the 
Euro pean Union (such as Brazil), especially if EU–
US negotiations over a future transatlantic trade 
and investment partnership (TTIP) advance. Such 
an agreement might benefit the PA countries as 
they already have FTAs with both the European 
Union and the United States. 
Conclusions
Although the PA has stressed that it is more than 
just another FTA, it has received most of its in­
ternational attention and support for its econom­
ic achievements and trade focus on the Asia-Pa­
cific region. However, the PA has also advanced 
in other niches of cooperation, such as academic 
exchange, technology and the integration of stock 
markets. It still needs to be seen whether the ex­
isting cooperation will spill over into other issue 
areas and whether the PA countries will cooper­
ate and define common positions in internation­
al forums. 
As salient the trade agenda of the PA may be, 
one cannot ignore the political and strategic side 
effects of the project. The PA has provoked reac­
tions from regional actors such as Venezuela and 
the other ALBA countries, as well as from Bra­
zil and some of its Mercosur partners. The for­
mer consider the PA to be an alternative, anti-
podal project to its socialist regional model in 
Latin America and a US tool with which Washington 
can reassert its hegemony. For Brazil, its concerns 
lie with losing control of its own sphere of influ­
ence as Mexico tries to get a foothold in the region. 
Moreover, the PA increases the centrifugal forces 
in Mercosur. The PA can also be seen as part of the 
political and economic dynamics that are evolv­
ing in the Asia-Pacific region and the great power 
competition between China and the United States. 
Likewise, the European Union may obtain more le­
verage in its relations with Latin America through 
its potential close cooperation and FTAs with the 
PA countries.
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